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ABSTRACT
Americans increasingly turn to the computer instead of
the television to gain access to their favorite shows. With
this in mind, Aereo allows its subscribers to stream
broadcast television content to their computers, but does
not compensate the broadcasters for these retransmissions.
The broadcasters argue this violates their public
performance right under the Copyright Act’s Transmit
Clause, but because of Aereo’s curious technology
platform, in which thousands of tiny antennas are each
assigned to a unique subscriber, infringement is uncertain.
The Supreme Court will soon hear American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., arising out of the Second
Circuit, and decide whether Aereo’s retransmissions on the
Internet constitute public performances. This Article argues
that Aereo is infringing the broadcasters’ public
performance right and that by expanding on the earlier
decision Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings,
Inc., the Second Circuit misinterpreted the text and the
spirit of the Copyright Act.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2012, a new technology company called Aereo
sprouted in New York City amid much controversy. 1 Its content
distribution model was novel. For a monthly membership fee,
Aereo subscribers are assigned one of thousands of tiny antennae
that can receive broadcast television airwaves. 2 Via these antennae,
Aereo streams television content to subscribers over the Internet. 3
Aereo also allows subscribers to copy these streams for later
viewing with the use of remote hard drives. Aereo does not have
any authorization from broadcast television providers to do so, and
it does not provide any compensation to broadcasters for these
transmissions. As a result, many major broadcasters brought suit,
arguing that Aereo was liable for infringing their rights to public

1

Brian Stelter, Broadcasters Circle Wagons Against a TV Streaming
Upstart, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/
business/media/aereo-has-tv-networks-circling-the-wagons.html.
2
Frequently Asked Questions, AEREO, https://aereo.com/faqs (last visited
Mar. 31, 2014).
3
Id.
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performance and retransmission. 4 In April 2013, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in WNET, Thirteen v.
Aereo, Inc. (Aereo) affirmed the district court’s denial of the
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction 5 and subsequently
denied en banc review. 6 In the wake of that denial Aereo has
rapidly expanded beyond New York City. 7 The Aereo court’s
reasoning indicated that had it not been for an earlier Second
Circuit decision, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings,
Inc. (“Cablevision”), 8 Aereo would have been liable. 9
Aereo convinced the Second Circuit that because it was
assigning a unique antenna to each subscriber and transmitting the
broadcast directly to that subscriber’s home, no public
performance occurred for purposes of the exclusive rights granted
under the Copyright Act. 10 The plaintiffs appealed the case to the
United States Supreme Court, which recently granted certiorari. 11
The Court’s eventual decision has the potential to change our
conception of what it means to publicly perform. Specifically, the
Court must address what constitutes an online public performance.
4

WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 896, 187 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2014).
5
Id. at 696 (“Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s determination that the balance of hardships does not tip decidedly in the
Plaintiffs’ favor. The district court reached this decision based on its conclusions
(1) that the Plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an
injunction and (2) that Aereo would suffer significant hardship if an injunction
should issue, since this would likely be the end of its business.”).
6
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013).
7
Where Can I Get Aereo?, AEREO, https://aereo.com/coverage (last visited
Mar. 31, 2014).
8
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536
F.3d 121 (2d. Cir. 2008).
9
Aereo, 712 F.3d at 695 (“Though presented as efforts to distinguish
Cablevision, many of Plaintiffs’ arguments really urge us to overrule
Cablevision. One panel of this Court, however, ‘ . . . cannot overrule a prior
decision of another panel.’ . . . Plaintiffs have provided us with no adequate
basis to distinguish Cablevision from the Aereo system. We therefore see no
error in the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on
the merits.”) (citing Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, AFLCIO, CLC v. U.S. I.N.S., 336 F.3d 200, 220 (2d Cir. 2003)).
10
Id. at 694.
11
Id. at 676.
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The issue has gained prominence as Aereo and similar
companies have expanded across the country. Aereo faced other
suits over its expansion into Salt Lake City, where it lost, 12 and
Boston, where it won. 13 Another company with a business model
and technology nearly identical to Aereo’s was found to be
infringing by a California district court in late 2012. 14 This
company lost in the District of Columbia as well. 15 The judicial
fortunes of these companies have diverged, but the upcoming
Supreme Court decision will hopefully provide much-needed
guidance.
We live in a time of unprecedented technological development,
enjoying convenient access to copyrighted work that our
forefathers could hardly have dreamed of. When Congress enacted
the current Copyright Act, most Americans consumed television
content that was broadcast by the major networks. The Internet
changed that. Today the Internet is ubiquitous and people can
easily stream and download copyrighted content at their
convenience, with or without the permission of the copyright
holders. This threatens the traditional business models of aging
corporations like the major broadcasters.
Can the statutory definition of public performance in the
Copyright Act provide guidance in today’s technological
landscape, or does the law need to be revised? This Article will
examine how the Second Circuit treated these issues in
Cablevision and Aereo and how it answered the central question of
whether the services sold by the defendants in both cases infringed
the public performance copyrights of broadcasters. The Second
Circuit’s ruling in Cablevision set the stage for a ruling in Aereo
against the broadcasters. This Article will argue because the court
12

Community Television of Utah v. Aereo, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00910-DN, at
1 (D. Utah, Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/208029378/aereoutah
13
Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-11649, 2013 WL 5604284 (D.
Mass. Oct. 8, 2013) (denying request for a preliminary injunction against Aereo
and largely adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Aereo).
14
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F.
Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
15
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC),
Case 1:13-cv-00758-RMC, at *1 (D. D.C. Sept. 5, 2013),
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0758-33.
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relied on an outdated common-law doctrine and a misreading of
the Copyright Act, both Aereo and Cablevision were decided
incorrectly. Aereo’s business of retransmitting copyrighted
material to its subscribers violates the public performance right of
broadcasting companies, and that the consequences of the Aereo
decision may be further-reaching than the court intended.
This Article will proceed by analyzing Cablevision and earlier
precedent in detail. It will then turn to Aereo and the expansion of
Cablevision’s interpretation of the public performance right,
followed by district courts’ subsequent analyses of the issue in the
Ninth and D.C. circuits. Ultimately, this Article will set the stage
for the forthcoming Supreme Court review and attempt to forecast
what is in store for broadcast television and the public performance
right in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.
I.

UNDERSTANDING STREAMING

Background on the definition of Internet “streaming” may help
contextualize these cases. The Copyright Act does not define
“streaming,” but Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “relating to or
being the transfer of data (as audio or video material) in a
continuous stream especially for immediate processing or
playback.” 16 For example, when a computer user streams a
television show for immediate playback on his computer, there is a
continuous transfer of data between that user’s computer and the
video or song host. Once the streaming has finished, the data are
no longer on the streamer’s computer. Streaming must be
distinguished from downloading, which allows the data to be
stored on the computer for later access.
Internet connections can be prone to intermittence, and
streaming can be easily interrupted or slowed. To counteract this
and allow a person to view streamed content uninterrupted, the
computer “buffers” the content. It gathers the data a few seconds
ahead of time before it is shown on a screen; if the continuous
stream should be interrupted, there will be a few seconds as back16

Dictionary,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/streaming (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
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up to allow the computer a chance to catch up without having to
interrupt the performance. The buffer data are not stored like
downloaded data, but are temporarily accessible by a streaming
program.
The distinction between downloading and streaming is
important in copyright law. Streaming implicates two statutory
rights: the right of reproduction and the right of public
performance. 17 The former concerns the tangible copying of
copyrighted works (such as bootlegged records or downloaded
material), while the latter is concerned with the performance of
copyrighted works. 18 There has been much discussion about
whether non-permissive streaming of copyrighted content violates
one or both rights. 19
While there is no statutory definition of streaming in the
Copyright Act, the Act includes language defining public
performance and transmission of works. The Copyright Act’s
definition a public performance contains what is known as the
Transmit Clause, which describes when transmission of
copyrighted content should be considered a public performance. 20
However, without further guidance from Congress or the Supreme
Court, lower courts have had to construe the definition of a public
performance as new technologies have challenged the boundaries
of that definition.
II.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR AEREO

In recent years, courts have considered the potential for
infringement by streaming technology, paving the way for the
Aereo decision. Much of the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Aereo
was based on the Cablevision court’s analysis of the public
performance and reproduction rights in the context of digital
transmissions of copyrighted television content. The Cablevision
decision, in turn, owed a debt to the earlier Third Circuit case
17

17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (5) (2012).
See id.
19
See, e.g., Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th
Cir. 1993).
20
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
18
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Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., in which the
court considered content performance in the pre-Internet era.
A. Cablevision and the Reproduction Right
In Cablevision, television content providers sued the
eponymous defendant cable television company for offering its
subscribers a remote-storage digital video recorder (RS-DVR)
system in addition to its normal programming content.21
Cablevision had a license to transmit television content to its
subscribers, but did not have a license to offer the RS-DVR, which
created a second transmission of the same content and allowed
subscribers to copy television content for later playback. Like all
cable companies, Cablevision gathered television content from
various broadcasters and other content providers and transmitted it
to subscribers, generally in real time. 22 The transmission can be
thought of as traveling along a single stream: content is transmitted
from broadcasters to Cablevision, which in turn transmits it to
subscribers. With its RS-DVR service, Cablevision bifurcated this
stream. 23 Unlike a stand-alone digital video recorder, the RS-DVR
allowed subscribers to record television content on remote hard
drives maintained by Cablevision. 24 Content was transmitted to
subscribers in real time, but a second transmission was sent to
Cablevision’s drives. Cablevision had a license for the first stream,
but not for the second stream.
The plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging direct infringement under three theories. First, they argued
Cablevision was making unauthorized copies of their content by
buffering their content for use in the RS-DVR. Second, the
plaintiffs argued that Cablevision was also making unauthorized
copies by allowing users to copy content onto Cablevision’s hard
drives for later playback. Third, the plaintiffs argued that
Cablevision was infringing their public performance right by
allowing subscribers to play back these recordings on their
21

Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123.
Id. at 124.
23
Id.
24
See id. at 125.
22
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televisions. This last argument and the court’s analysis of the
Transmit Clause was most relevant to the Aereo decision, but the
central issue in Cablevision was copying.
Ruling on the RS-DVR buffering argument, the court held the
activity was not infringing the plaintiffs’ right of reproduction. 25
Section 101 of the Copyright Act requires that for a work to be
considered to have been reproduced, or copied, it must be “fixed in
a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment . . . is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced
. . . for a period of more than transitory duration.” 26 The court
interpreted the section as imposing two requirements for a work to
have been “reproduced:” (1) it must be embodied in a medium (the
embodiment requirement), and (2) it must remain embodied “for a
period of more than transitory duration” (the duration
requirement). 27
Whether an online buffer met these requirements proved
complicated. The Cablevision court held that because a copy could
potentially be extracted from the buffer, the buffer met the
embodiment requirement. 28 However, the court believed that the
buffer did not meet the duration requirement: “No bit of data
remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2 seconds . . . .
[E]ach bit of data here is rapidly and automatically overwritten as
soon as it is processed.” 29 Thus, unauthorized buffering by itself,
and by extension streaming, was not a violation of the copyright
holder’s reproduction right.
In addressing the plaintiffs’ second theory—whether
Cablevision was liable for copying programs onto its hard drives
via its subscribers’ RS-DVRs—the court was chiefly concerned
with who made the copy. In order to be liable for direct
infringement, the court required volitional conduct in copying. 30
The court held that because it was the subscriber who ordered the
25

Id. at 130
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 127.
27
See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.02(B)(2) (rev. ed., 2013).
28
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 129.
29
Id. at 130.
30
Id. at 131.
26
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system to produce the copy, the subscriber was the actor with
volitional conduct, while Cablevision merely provided the
hardware and capability. 31 While the company might have been
liable for contributory infringement, the plaintiffs did not make this
argument, so the court felt no need to discuss the issue. 32
B. Cablevision and the Public Performance Right
The plaintiffs’ third and final argument—and the most
important to the later result in Aereo—was that Cablevision’s RSDVR service violated the plaintiff’s public performance right by
way of the Transmit Clause. Via the RS-DVR system, a
Cablevision subscriber requests a program he has recorded, and
Cablevision transmits the program from the company’s hard drives
to the subscriber’s home. 33 The plaintiffs argued these
transmissions directly infringed their right of public performance,
enumerated in Sections 106 and 101 of the Copyright Act. 34
Section 106(4) grants copyright holders the exclusive right, “in
the case of . . . motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 35 Section 101 further
defines what is meant by performing publicly:
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and
its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance
or display of the work to a place specified by clause
. . . or to the public, by means of any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable

31

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
33
Id. at 125.
34
Id.
35
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
32
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of receiving the performance or display receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the
same time or at different times. 36
There are essentially three definitions in this section, and the
second two make up what is known as the Transmit Clause. This
clause allows for transmissions of works to be public performances
within the meaning of the statute even if they are viewed in private
places such as homes. 37
Cablevision’s RS-DVR transmits performances, so it fits
within the second half of the Transmit Clause. The Cablevision
court noted that “[n]o one disputes that the RS-DVR playback
results in the transmission of a performance of a work––the
transmission from [Cablevision’s hard drives] to the customer’s

36

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
See NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 8.14(C)(1). Professor Nimmer wrestled
with how to limit the transmit clause, because it was at risk of reading out the
term “public” completely. If a television broadcast is a public performance even
when people are not physically assembled, then when can there be a private
performance? To elaborate on this dilemma, it is important to understand the
difference between the underlying copyrighted work and the many copies of that
work that people watch on their televisions. If performances can be public when
they are played in private hotels or even in private homes because that same
underlying work was transmitted to “separate places and at the same time or at
different times,” then it is hard to imagine when copyrighted works may be
transmitted privately and without violating the Copyright Act.
In order to work around this, Nimmer compromised and interpreted the
Copyright Act in a way that limited this dilemma. He stated, “Upon reflection, it
would seem that what must have been intended was that if the same copy (or
phonorecord) of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by
different members of the public, albeit at different times, this constitutes a
‘public’ performance.” Nimmer used an example of an old-fashioned peep show
device, in which many people observed its performance but at different times.
Limiting the transmit clause to single copies, while not found explicitly within
the Copyright Act, did limit the elimination of private performances, because it
separated the underlying work from individual performances by focusing on
single copies. If a single copy was used by different people at different times,
those performances could be considered public. But if a single copy was only
used by a single person and watched many times, this would not be a public
performance. This compromise was adopted into common law long before
Cablevision followed it.
37
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television set.” 38 But the court held Cablevision’s transmissions
via the RS-DVR were not public performances, stating that the
opposite holding would “render the ‘to the public’ language
surplusage.” 39 The court felt that if it considered these RS-DVR
transmissions public performances, it would “obviate[] any
possibility of a purely private transmission.” 40
The court found support for its decision in the Third Circuit
ruling in Redd Horne 41 and the treatise Nimmer on Copyright,
using what can be called the “single copy requirement.” The court
held,
[T]he use of a unique copy may limit the potential
audience of a transmission and is therefore relevant
to whether that transmission is made “to the
public.” . . . Given that each RS–DVR transmission
is made to a given subscriber using a copy made by
that subscriber, we conclude that such a
transmission is not “to the public,” without
analyzing the contours of that phrase in great
detail. 42
The Cablevision court felt that the single copy requirement
may “limit the potential audience of a transmission . . . .” 43 But a
problem arises once making copies of performances becomes
extremely cheap and distributing them to thousands of people
38

Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134.
Id. at 135.
40
Id. at 136.
41
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.
1984).
42
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138. Note the court’s first conclusion, that the
use of a unique copy may limit the potential audience of a transmission. This
was Nimmer’s great compromise: by limiting the potential audience to those
seeing a particular copy of a work, one could avoid the dilemma of defining a
public performance under the transmit clause in too broad a sense. NIMMER,
supra note 27, at § 8.14[C][3]. That is, if the transmit clause is interpreted to
mean the potential audience of the underlying work, and thus essentially the
entire public (because anyone can conceivably gain access to work such as a
freely available television broadcast), the "public" part of a public performance
becomes essentially meaningless.
43
Id.
39
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individually becomes technically feasible and profitable. This is
essentially what Aereo did. The Cablevision court’s focus on
whether a performance stems from a unique copy is what allowed
for the distorted outcome of Aereo, permitting a company to take
copyrighted content and distribute it to its subscribers on a mass
scale without compensating the copyright holders. Although the
single copy requirement, which arose out of the Redd Horne
decision and a discussion in the Nimmer treatise, made sense at the
time given the technological restrictions and cost of making copies,
it is much harder to justify in today’s technological landscape.
C. Redd Horne and the Single Copy Requirement
Entertainment content companies’ inability to evolve is not
unprecedented. Other emerging technologies have, in the past,
upended established business models. Redd Horne concerned one
such upending. A videotape shop, Maxwell’s, rented tapes (all
legitimately purchased) to customers and provided them with
private screening rooms in the shop where they could watch their
rentals. 44 Each room could accommodate no more than four
people, and the tapes were played from a central bank of videotape
machines (VCRs) behind a counter, operated by Maxwell’s
employees. 45 A selected movie would be transmitted from one
VCR to a television in one of the private rooms. 46 A number of
motion picture companies sued, arguing Maxwell’s was infringing
on their public performance right under the Copyright Act. 47
The court determined that viewing these tapes constituted a
performance and proceeded to analyze whether these performances
were public under the Transmit Clause. 48 The court held these
performances to be public, finding no functional difference
between Maxwell’s services and those offered by movie theaters. 49
The court held that the relevant “place” within the meaning of the
44

Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 157.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 158.
49
Id. at 160.
45
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§ 101 definition was each of Maxwell’s two stores, not each
individual booth within each store. “Simply because the cassettes
can be viewed in private does not mitigate the essential fact that
Maxwell’s is unquestionably open to the public.” 50
The Redd Horne court’s discussion of the relevant place is
particularly interesting in light of the Cablevision decision. The
Cablevision court focused on each particular performance viewed
by a subscriber. 51 But Redd Horne should have guided the court to
focus on whether any member of the public could pay a fee to view
a performance. The court could have viewed the relevant place of
performance to have been the entire Cablevision “store,” or
focused on the company’s service as a whole rather than each
individual performance. Instead, its analysis was better suited to
the individual booths in Maxwell’s, which were not open to the
public.
But the use of individual copies was at least as important as the
place of performance. In his famed treatise, Professor Nimmer
presciently posed a hypothetical concerning “theaters in which
patrons occupy separate screening rooms.” 52 Nimmer rightly stated
that it would be absurd to expect every consumer to obtain a public
performance license to play their legitimately purchased records,
simply because the same copyrighted work had been played at
another time. 53 In order to deal with this potential audience
problem under the Transmit Clause, Nimmer found a creative
solution that was an effective limitation to this problem—one that
worked in a pre-Internet era. Nimmer stated, “what must have been
intended was that if the same copy (or phonorecord) of a given
work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by different members
of the public, albeit at different times, this constitutes a ‘public’
performance.” 54 Finding public performances through the repeated
use of a single copy by different members of the public creates
legal room for private performances without having to excise the
Transmit Clause’s language on performances that are
50

Id. at 159.
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135.
52
NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 8.14(C)(3).
53
Id.
54
Id.
51
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chronologically dispersed. Redd Horne adopted this rationale and
found Maxwell’s to be infringing because it played the same
copies of movies repeatedly for different customers. 55
The problem with the single copy requirement as an answer to
public performances under the Transmit Clause is that it diverts the
focus away from the composition of the audience and onto copies
of the work, and its reasoning (while sensible for the time) cannot
be found in the statute or in legislative reports. While the court in
Cablevision agreed with and continued to use the single copy
requirement, it admitted that “neither the Redd Horne court nor
Prof. Nimmer explicitly explains why the use of a distinct copy
affects the Transmit Clause inquiry.” 56 The impracticalities of
duplicate copies vanish when technology advances to a point
where one could easily generate new copies at low or no cost, such
as when Cablevision generates a new stream with its RS-DVR for
each performance of a work requested by a subscriber, or when
Aereo captures broadcasted content and transmits it to a subscriber
from a single antenna.
III.

AEREO

In WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., Aereo successfully
contended that it was providing a “technology platform that
enables consumers to use remotely-located equipment . . . to
create, access and view their own unique recorded copies of free
over-the-air broadcast television programming.” 57 Essentially,
Aereo argued that its transmissions were private performances. 58
Aereo’s act of assigning an individual antenna to each subscriber
55

Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159. This was not so explicitly stated in the
Third Circuit decision, but was explained more thoroughly in the district court
decision. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne Inc., 568 F. Supp. 494,
501 (1983) (“The two Maxwell’s facilities each have only one copy of a given
film title and, therefore, must perform the same copy of a given work repeatedly.
We find that Congress intended that this portion of the definition also serve as
protection for copyright owners from infringing performances such as those
accomplished by Maxwell’s showcasing.”).
56
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138.
57
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 696, 696–97 (2d Cir. 2013).
58
Id.
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was key to the court’s belief that the individual streams created
unique copies of content for that user and were private
performances, thus satisfying the single copy requirement that
arose out of Nimmer’s treatise and Redd Horne and was adopted in
Cablevision. 59
Aereo did not shed new light upon the public performance right
so much as it expanded upon the conclusion in Cablevision. In
finding that Aereo and its subscribers were engaging in private
performances just like the parties in Cablevision, the court found
both companies’ systems shared two essential characteristics: they
created a unique copy for each user and transmitted that to the
associated user. 60 Because of these characteristics, the court found
these transmissions to be private performances.
Though unsuccessful, two of the plaintiffs’ arguments in Aereo
are worth noting. First, they argued that because Cablevision had a
license to transmit content in the first place, the question in that
case was whether the defendants needed a second license in order
to operate the RS-DVR service. 61 The plaintiffs argued it was
pertinent Aereo had no license to transmit in the first place. 62 The
court rejected this argument, finding the issue of whether Aereo
had a license irrelevant because the main question was whether
Aereo’s transmissions were public performances. 63 According to
the court, “whether Aereo has a license is not relevant to whether
its transmissions are public and therefore must be licensed.” 64 The
court also drew support from Cablevision by pointing out the court
in that case was also not concerned with licensing. 65
Judge Chin, dissenting, found the licensing distinction
significant:
Aereo is doing precisely what cable companies,
satellite television companies, and authorized
Internet streaming companies do—they capture
59
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over-the-air broadcasts and retransmit them to
customers—except that those entities are doing it
legally, pursuant to statutory or negotiated licenses,
for a fee. By accepting Aereo’s argument that it
may do so without authorization and without paying
a fee, the majority elevates form over substance. 66
This “form over substance” point is instructive. Both
Cablevision and Aereo include detailed explanations of the
technology platforms, and the outcomes of the cases were largely
based on how the technology was set up—what Judge Chin in
referred to as the “form.” Judge Chin argued the focus should be
on the “substance,” which was whether Aereo’s system fit the
plain meaning of public transmission.
The plaintiffs’ other notable argument was that Aereo’s system
was functionally very different from Cablevision’s. As the court
described it, the plaintiffs analogized Cablevision’s RS-DVR
system to a typical VCR, while Aereo’s system was more similar
to a cable television provider. 67 The court responded to this
argument by acknowledging that while “the Cablevision court did
compare the RS–DVR system to the stand-alone VCR, these
comparisons occur in the section of that opinion discussing
Cablevision’s potential liability for infringing the plaintiffs’
reproduction right.” 68 Thus, “[n]o part of Cablevision’s analysis of
the public performance right appears to have been influenced by
any analogy to the stand-alone VCR.” 69
It appears the court, much like with the licensing issue, did not
deny the logic of the plaintiffs’ argument but instead considered it
irrelevant. The court curiously dismissed the argument by simply
pointing out that the VCR analogy in Cablevision was drawn in the
section of that opinion dealing with the reproduction right, rather
than the public performance right. 70 Context matters, but given
Cablevision’s application of the single copy requirement, which
deals with the public performance right but it also concerned with
66
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reproduction, it seems strange to cordon these two rights off from
each other.
In his dissent, Judge Chin felt the issue of Aereo’s primary
function was instructive. He argued that a service’s design and use
is important to the analysis of infringement. 71 Judge Chin
distinguished the two services and stated, “Cablevision’s RS–DVR
system ‘exist[ed] only to produce a copy’ of material that it already
had a license to retransmit to its subscribers, but the Aereo system
produces copies to enable it to transmit material to its
subscribers.” 72 Judge Chin argued that the functionality and
primary purpose of these services can provide guidance as to
whether they infringe or not:
Aereo’s use of copies is essential to its ability to
retransmit broadcast television signals, while
Cablevision’s copies were merely an optional
alternative to a set-top DVR. The core of Aereo’s
business is streaming broadcasts over the Internet in
real-time; the addition of the record function,
however, cannot legitimize the unauthorized
retransmission of copyrighted content. 73
This argument is related to the licensing argument. Cablevision
was not offering any new service for receiving content because it
already provided cable television service. It had a license to
provide this core service, one that subscribers paid for. The issue in
Cablevision was the secondary transmission via the RS-DVR,
which copied programs to be watched later and the primary
function of which was copying already authorized transmissions,
not the transmitted material in the first place. Thus Cablevision
was about the reproduction right and not the public performance
right.
But the latter was more important in Aereo. Aereo’s primary
function is live streaming, and this primary transmission (unlike
the secondary one in Cablevision) was the one that caused the
dispute. Aereo’s service can be used record programs as well, as
71

Id. at 703.
Id. at 702 (citations omitted).
73
Id.
72

256

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 9:3

Judge Chin noted, 74 but that should not divert the focus over its
primary transmission and whether or not that transmission was
authorized.
These arguments might have prevailed, and Aereo might have
been liable for infringement, if not for the Cablevision precedent.
The court invoked stare decisis, explaining that, “though presented
as efforts to distinguish Cablevision, many of Plaintiffs’ arguments
really urge us to overrule Cablevision.” 75 This the Second Circuit
was unwilling to do. However, other courts that have considered
the issues have declined to adopt the Cablevision rule.
IV.

DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS IN OTHER CIRCUITS

While Aereo is currently the only circuit-level case on
unlicensed single-copy Internet broadcasting, some district courts
have considered similar issues. Firstly, Aereo was sued in the
Massachusetts District Court soon after it expanded into Boston,
and the court there recently denied a motion for a preliminary
injunction against Aereo. 76 Another company has had far less
judicial success than Aereo. The company, known variously as
BarryDriller, Aereokiller, FilmOn, and FilmOn X (henceforth
referred to in this Article by the latter name), also retransmits
broadcast television over the Internet to paying subscribers without
paying the owners of the broadcasted copyrighted content. 77 Just
like Aereo, FilmOn X utilizes large banks of small antennas in an
attempt to get around the single copy requirement. 78
The District Court for the Central District of California held in
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC
that FilmOn X was infringing the plaintiffs’ public performance
right. 79 Further, in Fox Television Stations Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC
74
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the District Court for the District of Columbia granted a
preliminary injunction against FilmOnX, concluding that “the
Copyright Act forbids FilmOn X from retransmitting Plaintiffs’
copyrighted programs over the Internet,” and the plaintiffs were
“thus likely to succeed on their claim that FilmOn X violates
[their] exclusive public performance rights in their copyrighted
works.” 80 FilmOn X appealed both of these cases, but the appeals
have been stayed pending the Supreme Court decision. 81
A. Fox Television Stations v. BarryDriller
In BarryDriller, FilmOn X argued their service was
technologically analogous to Aereo’s and thus legal under Aereo. 82
The plaintiffs sued for the same reasons as in Aereo, arguing that
FilmOn X was infringing their right of public performance under
the Transmit Clause. 83 The court held for the plaintiffs, who have
appealed. 84 The BarryDriller court brought up Cablevision early in
its analysis, mentioning that court’s reliance on the single copy
requirement and its focus on a particular performance of a work
rather than the underlying work to find that Cablevision and its
subscribers were engaging in private performances. 85 But the
BarryDriller court took a different approach, and held the
Copyright Act in Section 101 states a performance is public when
the underlying copyrighted work is performed publicly, not a
particular performance of the copyrighted work. 86 According to
BarryDriller, “The definition section sets forth what constitutes a
public performance of a copyrighted work, and says that
F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
80
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Case 1:13-cv-00758-RMC, at *1 (D. D.C. Sept. 5, 2013).
81
Kurt Orzeck, 9th Circ. Halts FilmOn Case Until Justices Rule On Aereo,
LAW360, (Jan. 29, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/505263/
9th-circ-halts-filmon-case-until-justices-rule-on-aereo.
82
BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1140–41.
83
Id. at 1143.
84
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Aereokiller,
LLC; 2013 WL 1888669 (9th Cir. 2013).
85
BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
86
Id. 1144.

258

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 9:3

transmitting a performance to the public is a public performance. It
does not require a ‘performance’ of a performance.” 87 While this
may sound confusing, this is tackling the same problem addressed
in Cablevision. That is, when analyzing whether a performance
was public, does one look at the particular performance in
question, or the underlying work that was performed? The
BarryDriller court held, in contrast to the rationale in Cablevision
and Aereo, that focusing on the underlying work was the relevant
approach. 88
The BarryDriller court held the focus should not be on a
particular transmission and should instead be on the underlying
copyrighted work. 89 The court refuted Cablevision’s embrace of
the single copy requirement by holding there was no such
requirement in the Copyright Act or in the legislative history. 90
The court went on:
Very few people gather around their oscilloscopes
to admire the sinusoidal waves of a television
broadcast transmission. People are interested in
watching the performance of the work. And it is the
public performance of the copyrighted work with
which the Copyright Act, by its express language, is
concerned. Thus, Cablevision’s focus on the
uniqueness of the individual copy from which a
transmission is made is not commanded by the
statute. 91
It seems BarryDriller equated a transmission to “the sinusoidal
waves of a television broadcast transmission” on an oscilloscope,
and was not by itself a performance. Cablevision may not have
been mistaken by stating transmissions could be performances
themselves, even if its ruling as a whole was misguided. But this
difference may be beside the point, because either way the
87
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question is whether, under the Transmit Clause, we consider the
audience of a particular transmission or the underlying work.
BarryDriller held a performance should be understood as the
content people watch, and that the single copy requirement was not
in the statute.
Notably, the BarryDriller court looked to the physical distance
a transmission has to travel from the antenna to the receiving
device, a distinction found nowhere in Cablevision or Aereo:
Defendants . . . analogized their service to selfcontained portable televisions of the kind that have
been available for many years which can be used,
e.g., by attendees at a football game to watch
another game being played at the same time. That
argument ignores a key distinction. In marked
contrast to Defendants’ system here, such portable
televisions play the broadcast signal within inches
of the place the signal is received by the attached
antenna, and do not ‘send[ ] out some sort of signal
via a device or process to be received by the public
at a place beyond the place from which it is sent.’ 92
Under this reasoning, performances are private when the
source of the transmission is very close to the person viewing the
performance. In Cablevision, the court discussed the hypothetical
“hapless customer who records a program in his den and later
transmits the recording to a television in his bedroom [who] would
be liable for publicly performing the work simply because some
other party had once transmitted the same underlying performance
to the public.” 93 Under BarryDriller, this customer could escape
liability because the distance between the recording device in his
den and the television in his bedroom is a matter of feet and not
miles, as in the cases of Cablevision and Aereo. This physical
proximity could offer a limiting factor to Transmit Clause analysis
in the spirit of the single copy requirement, but without the same
distorting effects.
Also pertinent in the hapless customer example is the
92
93
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noncommercial nature of the transmission from den to bedroom.
Commerciality was relevant in BarryDriller, as the court
distinguished between a single person making copies for himself
and a commercial provider who provides this service for its
subscribers. 94 Commerciality by itself would probably not be
sufficient to find a performance public, but it can still lend
persuasive weight.
B. Fox Television Stations v. FilmOn X
FilmOn X concerned the same company as BarryDriller, and
the facts were nearly identical save for the location, which this
time was Washington, D.C. As in BarryDriller, the FilmOn X
court rejected the Aereo analysis and granted the plaintiffs’ motion
for a temporary injunction. 95 The court held the Transmit Clause
should be interpreted broadly to include technologies Congress
may not have anticipated, such as the one offered by FilmOn X. 96
The court also disputed whether FilmOn X’s technology
platform actually facilitated a one-to-one relationship between a
single mini-antenna and a subscriber. The court explained:
[T]his is a charitable description of FilmOn X’s
arrangement; while each user may have an assigned
antenna and hard-drive directory temporarily, the
mini-antennas are networked together so that a
single tuner server and router, video encoder, and
distribution endpoint can communicate with them
all. The television signal is captured by FilmOn X
and passes through FilmOn X’s single electronic
transmission process of aggregating servers and
electronic equipment. This system, through which
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any member of the public who clicks on the link for
the video feed, is hardly akin to an individual user
stringing up a television antenna on the roof. 97
This line of reasoning, not found in Aereo, points out that
whether equipment is shared among users is relevant if a court is
going to focus on specific technology, as the Aereo court did.
However, it seems dubious whether courts should really offer
much weight to the specific technology of a company; the focus on
technology in Cablevision is what gave Aereo the ability to operate
and exploit a loophole. Focusing on technology in courts breeds
loopholes, because technology can develop much faster than court
reasoning can. This is not to say that how technology operates is
irrelevant to a court’s analysis. Technology matters. It just should
not dictate how a court will rule. More important than the
technology itself is how the technology affects the law and the
marketplace. That said, if courts are going to focus on specific
technicalities, FilmOn X makes a valid point to not focus purely on
the mini-antennae and look at other facets of the company’s
technology.
In this vein, the FilmOn X court pointed to the commercial
nature of the defendant and held that there were no meaningful
differences from cable companies, which were required to obtain
licenses to retransmit broadcasted content. 98 The court stated the
relationship cable companies had with broadcasters was the
primary motivation for the enactment of the Copyright Act in
1976. 99 The court noted:
It speaks volumes that Congress settled on a
compulsory licensing regime for cable companies
that wish to carry over-the-air broadcasts. Whether
FilmOn X should be subject to a similar licensing
regime is not before the Court. It suffices to say that
nothing about the 1976 Act or its legislative history
suggests that Congress intended a commercial entity
that
rebroadcasts
copyright
material
for
97
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consumption by the public, such as FilmOn X, to
avoid liability for infringement of the copyright
holders’ exclusive right to public performance. 100
The court here drew a parallel between FilmOn X’s technology
platform and that of cable companies, and found no meaningful
difference under the Transmit Clause. This was in stark contrast to
Aereo, which found great importance in how the defendants’
technology operated. The FilmOn X court chose not to focus on
technicalities, deciding instead to focus on the actual effect the
defendants had on the marketplace and its potential to change
judicial copyright analysis should they be held not liable.
Suffice it to say that there is disagreement among the federal
courts at this point. Now that the Supreme Court has agreed to
weigh in on the issues, we can hope for more clarity.
V.

LOOKING FORWARD: LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND THE
FUTURE OF TELEVISION

Where does this leave us? The litigation is still ongoing as
Aereo expands across the country, so one can only guess as to how
the Supreme Court will rule. Aereo shows a map on its blog of the
numerous cities to which it plans to expand; unsurprisingly, all are
outside of the Ninth Circuit. 101 Much of Aereo’s business strategy
has been built around its litigation success, and its future looks
bright unless the Supreme Court decides differently.
Whatever the outcome at the Court, the time appears ripe for
Congress to act, should it find the political will. Representative
Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the Committee of the Judiciary in the
U.S. House of Representatives, recently announced a
comprehensive review of copyright law. 102 Representative
100

Id.
Where Can I Get Aereo?, AEREO, https://aereo.com/coverage (last
visited Mar. 31, 2014).
102
Casey Rae, House Judiciary to Examine US Copyright Law, FUTURE
MUSIC
COALITION
(Apr.
25,
2013,
11:33
AM),
OF
https://futureofmusic.org/blog/2013/04/25/house-judiciary-examine-us101

2014]

AEREO AND CABLEVISION

263

Goodlatte noted that “[f]ederal judges are forced to make decisions
using laws that are difficult to apply today,” and that “[e]ven the
Copyright Office itself faces challenges in meeting the growing
needs of its customers—the American public.” 103
Why can’t broadcasters be required to issue a license to
companies like Aereo for their copyrighted material, allowing for
both sides to profit? This would parallel the legal framework set up
for cable companies, and it seems strange to treat companies like
Aereo differently, even though they are not technically cable
companies. However, such a regime is not without drawbacks.
Section 111 of the Copyright Act addresses secondary
transmissions by cable providers. 104 This section sets up a
compulsory licensing regime that requires television broadcasters
to license copyrighted material to cable providers. Companies have
argued that § 111 of the Copyright Act should be construed
broadly to include online streaming service providers like Aereo,
requiring broadcasters to provide a compulsory license for their
material, 105 but this argument has not yet proved successful. 106
The ambiguity of the statutory language is problematic. As one
court stated, “[b]ased on the statutory text alone, it is simply not
clear whether a service that retransmits television programming
live and over the Internet constitutes a cable system under §
111.” 107 However, in finding that § 111 did not apply to Internet
copyright-law.
103
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retransmission, the court leaned on the Copyright Office’s position
that such services “are not cable systems and do not qualify for §
111 compulsory licenses.” 108
The Copyright Office has expressed concern that compulsory
licensing for retransmissions “would effectively wrest control
away from program producers . . . and would likely undercut
private negotiations, leaving content owners with relatively little
bargaining power in the distribution of broadcast programming.”109
But the Aereo court has effectively subverted the Copyright
Office’s concern by functionally gutting the public performance
rights of broadcasters. Companies like Aereo may well not be
subject to § 111 licensing, but the views of the FilmOn X court,
which issued a national injunction against FilmOn X, show that
some courts may still find no meaningful difference between these
new companies and cable companies. If the Copyright Office’s
position has merit, perhaps Congress should look to removing the
existing compulsory licensing regime for cable companies. The
cable industry is certainly far better established than it was in 1976,
and removing these outlays would allow for more equal bargaining
positions among television providers.
Whether the protection of copyrighted content is to come from
Congress or the courts, Aereo leaves open the possibility that many
content creators large and small may lose their right of public
performance once their content is placed on the Internet. It is
plausible to imagine Aereo’s one-to-one relationship between
subscribers and mini-antennae expanded to other media besides
broadcast television. Music, movies or any other media could be
transmitted by companies that hold large arrays of transmitters
where a single one sends information to a single user and the
company avoids copyright liability. The concern is not just with
public performances and the broadcast industry, but our entire
conception of copyright protection with regards to the Internet.
In this new environment, will the traditional television soon be
obsolete? It seems the primary thing holding back a complete
transformation into Internet-delivered television is the speed at
108
109
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which people can access the Internet. But that too is changing
rapidly. People will no longer be held back from streaming
television and movies online, and distribution models like Aereo
will present an even greater threat to established businesses. People
today are simply no longer consuming content like they did in the
1950s, where tens of millions of Americans crowded around
television sets nationwide to watch a program. Broadcasters—and
possibly copyright law—will have to adapt to these new
surroundings or they risk going the way of the VCR and rotary
telephone—obsolescence.
CONCLUSION
This Article can only conclude so much, because litigation over
the Aereo model continues. Broadcasters face falling revenues as
the television market diversifies and splinters due to the continuing
development of Internet-based distribution. The New York Times
has reported that ratings among the Big Four broadcasters
“together are dropping more precipitously than ever . . . .
Advertisers are moving more cash to cable, cutting into the
networks’ quarterly profits. New technologies are making it easier
to skip those ads, anyway.” 110 What is clear is that the market is
changing. This Article does not advocate for one industry or
company over another, but instead attempts to show how courts
have struggled to harmonize the rapidly developing Internet with
existing copyright law. The Copyright Act is still relevant, even in
the age of the Internet, but it will require some reinterpretation
with regards to public performances.
Are broadcasters merely grappling with another tough
competitor, or are they actually facing an existential threat? If
Aereo stands, there seems little stopping other companies from
cannibalizing the profits of the broadcasting industry. The Aereo
and Cablevision courts held that the defendants were not infringing
because their technological models were set up in such a way as to
110
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create a supposed “purely private transmission,” 111 even though
these models were for-profit and based on distributing content to a
potentially wide swath of the general public. Other companies in
other industries may well follow this reasoning and further
circumvent broadcasters’ profit avenues. As the law stands now,
there is little stopping cable and satellite companies from setting up
“purely private transmissions” of their own and circumventing any
compensation to the broadcast industry. This could also expand to
other forms of media, such as music or movies, though courts have
treated them differently. Courts need not protect industries out of
some sense of nostalgia. Businesses and industries evolve as
technology develops. Such is the nature of capitalism. But when it
comes to copyright law, courts should focus more on how a party
affects a market overall, and not on how its technological minutiae
may be used to exploit perceived loopholes in copyright law. If our
country is to preserve its historic protections of public performance
rights, digital retransmission of broadcast television content should
be considered a public performance if it reaches a wide audience,
whether or not tiny antennae are used in the process.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Whether a commercial entity sends or receives a
transmission can indicate that the transmission is a public
performance, but this should be considered only alongside
other factors.



Physical proximity between the source of a transmission
and the location at which it is viewed may be another factor
in finding whether a performance is public, though this has
not been adopted above the district court level.



When examining whether a public performance right has
been violated, courts may focus either on a specific copy of
a performance (the single copy requirement) or the
performance’s underlying work. Stay tuned for the
forthcoming Supreme Court decision.
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